Edison要去當兵了~給我一些意見吧!!
- David_Liao
- YOYO member
- 文章: 300
- 註冊時間: 週日 8月 17, 2003 12:21 am
- 來自: inner cosomos
- 聯繫:
看起來好吃的餐廳,David Liao是一定會去的啦,Edison你眼睛只要不是白色的,多在口袋放幾根煙和打火機外加檳榔,就可以在軍中混得很好 。
記得有機會就去採買,A點酒給廚房,他們以後會給你加雞腿的
"Space...the final frontier... to explore strange new worlds; to seek out new life and new civilizations... to boldy go where no one has gone before."
小道長練功坊
小道長練功坊
- David Chen
- YOYO member
- 文章: 107
- 註冊時間: 週二 4月 19, 2005 3:12 pm
艾迪小生
不用那麼擔心啦...妳是在中坑新訓對吧
我以前在那邊當了一年多的排長 地方很不錯 是五星級的營區
而且應該很輕鬆
有句俗話:
血濺車龍埔 淚灑關東橋
魂段金六結 歡樂滿中坑....
中坑有三個營區 妳應該是在精南OR 精北...兩個都是很新的營舍
不過地方很荒涼 建議最好想辦法弄台機車之類的
北門旁邊的"日統客運"有台北到大林的直達車
由大林到中坑滿方便的說
到南部當兵就不要太想著北部的事情(不過還是要常回yoyo啦 )
像妳沒有"家累" 就放開心情認識認識當地的人 交些朋友也不錯
中坑就在"華梵管理學院"和"中正大學旁邊"....
趕快找找有沒有能接待你的朋友吧~~~
去外島的機會沒那麼大 真的要去 其實聽說也滿輕鬆的
越遠越輕鬆...因為沒督導
有朋友去南沙 說唯一的任務就是活下去....
完全沒事....可以每天看書 釣魚 作砂畫
不用那麼擔心啦...妳是在中坑新訓對吧
我以前在那邊當了一年多的排長 地方很不錯 是五星級的營區
而且應該很輕鬆
有句俗話:
血濺車龍埔 淚灑關東橋
魂段金六結 歡樂滿中坑....
中坑有三個營區 妳應該是在精南OR 精北...兩個都是很新的營舍
不過地方很荒涼 建議最好想辦法弄台機車之類的
北門旁邊的"日統客運"有台北到大林的直達車
由大林到中坑滿方便的說
到南部當兵就不要太想著北部的事情(不過還是要常回yoyo啦 )
像妳沒有"家累" 就放開心情認識認識當地的人 交些朋友也不錯
中坑就在"華梵管理學院"和"中正大學旁邊"....
趕快找找有沒有能接待你的朋友吧~~~
去外島的機會沒那麼大 真的要去 其實聽說也滿輕鬆的
越遠越輕鬆...因為沒督導
有朋友去南沙 說唯一的任務就是活下去....
完全沒事....可以每天看書 釣魚 作砂畫
There are only the pursued, the pursuing, the busy and the tired.
- Grace Chen
- YOYO member
- 文章: 19
- 註冊時間: 週六 10月 08, 2005 10:40 pm
- 來自: Taipei
保重呀!!
dear Edison
認識時間的長短不代表感情的濃度
才認識yoyo不久 你就要給我去當兵啦
重感情的我 真是萬般的不捨
捨不得少了ㄍ姊妹一起聊天....呵呵
真的啦 當兵要多吃點 練壯點
到時候記得mail你頭髮剃掉ㄉ照片
免得到時候回來認不得 被誤以為是new comer
我會想念你低!!
認識時間的長短不代表感情的濃度
才認識yoyo不久 你就要給我去當兵啦
重感情的我 真是萬般的不捨
捨不得少了ㄍ姊妹一起聊天....呵呵
真的啦 當兵要多吃點 練壯點
到時候記得mail你頭髮剃掉ㄉ照片
免得到時候回來認不得 被誤以為是new comer
我會想念你低!!
- technobabel
- YOYO member
- 文章: 1188
- 註冊時間: 週六 5月 14, 2005 8:42 pm
- 來自: Eastern Seaboard
Potentially, This is not a bad discussion topic. Lots of interesting terminology, feel free to use it, if you have to.
From: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... budget.htm
The core policy of Taiwan's National Military Strategy is to avoid war, and to assure the security and stability of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan must maintain an appropriate defense capability to guarantee the survival of the island as well as the security and prosperity of the people. Taiwan's major equipment acquisition policies are as follows: 1. Under the strategic directive of effective deterrence, robust defense, acquisitions must meet the basic requirements of major weapons and equipment for Taiwan's defense operations. 2. Acquisitions must be consistent with complete life-cycle management and integrated logistic planning. 3. Acquisitions must comply with technology transfers, or training packages and other software so that weapons and equipment can be used to their full effect.
In order for Taiwan to reach their goal of effective defense, important elements of their buildup and development include early warning, information & electronic warfare superiority, counter blockade capability, long-range precision, and force integration. In addition, a C4ISR system has also become a strategic objective, as it would enhance the combat power of the combined joint operations of the Taiwan armed forces. Taiwan is expected to build its national defense capability to emphasize quality and power over quantity by fielding a C4ISR system and by acquiring defensive weapons. The key to success in defending Taiwan is information superiority over the PRC. Information superiority is essential, because the characteristics of the PLA threat include synchronized, multi-faceted, surprise, and quick attacks. Information warfare is expected to be a prelude to an attack against Taiwan, and in order to counter the threats of the PLA, the Taiwan Armed Forces need to immediately take synchronized, and rapid defensive combat actions. From a C4ISR system point of view, information superiority is crucial to achieving victory in combat. In order to enhance Taiwan's defensive capability, Taiwan's Armed Forces need a more sophisticated CS4ISR system that would provide the quick response, long range, high precision, and robustness demanded by future combat situations.
As the Legislative Yuan (LY) assumes more control of the MND budget, procurement plans require more staffing and approvals are slow. This adds to the frustrations felt by the Taiwan military, U.S. defense contractors and the U.S. Military Departments. Even with the difficulties encountered, the U.S. will continue to support the Taiwan military with defensive military equipment, technology, training and assistance in the years to come.
The defense budget for the ROC military was reduced annually during the 1990s and became more and more open to public scrutiny. The downward trend in ROC military expenditures was especially evident in fiscal 1994, when the budget shrank 4.65 percent. The defense budget is becoming increasingly public. In fiscal 1996, only 36 percent of the budget was considered confidential, in comparison to 51 percent in fiscal 1993 and 46 percent in 1994, respectively. The defense budget for fiscal 1996 will occupy just under 23 percent of the total government budget, down from 24.5 percent of the previous year.
Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) had a budget of US $9.57 billion for Fiscal Year 1996, which began July 1, 1995, a 2 percent increase over the previous year's budget. The national defense budget accounted for 23 percent of the total budget of the central authorities, a slight reduction from its 24.5 percent share of the total FY 95 budget. US $3.4 billion or 35.5 percent, of that budget was reportedly spent on military investment. Defense spending' as a percentage of Taiwan's GDP has been steadily decreasing over the past several years. The national defense budget for FY 1996 represented 3.6 percent of Taiwan's overall GDP.
Taiwan's National Defense budget amounted to New Taiwan Dollars (NTD) 274.78 billion or approximately USD 9.46 billion, for fiscal year 1998. The National Defense Budget accounted for 22.43 percent of the total budget of the Central Authorities, a 0.08 percent reduction from its 22.51 percent share of the total FY 97 budget. Defense spending's share of Taiwan's GDP has been steadily decreasing over the past several years. The National Defense Budget for FY 1998 represented 3.26 percent of Taiwan's overall GDP.
The national defense budget for FY 1999 amounted to NTD 284.5 billion (approx. USD 8.89 billion), or 22.7 percent of the total budget of the Central Authorities. The National Defense Budget for FY 1999 is projected to account for 3.06 percent of Taiwan's overall GDP. The budget for weapons purchases reportedly is NTD 60 billion (about USD 1.88 billion).
It has been projected that Taiwan will spend in excess of NT$700 billion (US$20.68 billion) for 11 items as a part of its arms-procurement spending from 2003 through 2012. While the U.S. supplies the bulk of Taiwan arms purchases, and will continue to do so in the years to come, Taiwan's indigenous capabilities have gradually expanded, with a majority of the building taking place with the United States' assistance. To fulfill current customers' needs, total services and commercial logistic support to maintain or upgrade Taiwan's existing defense force are required. In the near future, the most urgent defense requirements are the integration tasks between current platforms and weapons within and among Taiwan's armed forces. However, the Taiwan defense industry's long-range plans include integrated battlefield management and C4ISR upgrades.
On the horizon, and as a matter of public record, are the intended purchases of four Kidd-class destroyers, 12 P-3C Orion submarine-hunting aircraft, nine CH-47SD Chinook transport helicopters, eight conventional submarines, a batch of new Tienkung-series air defense missiles, a dozen MH-53H mine sweeping helicopters, Paladin artillery system, AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles, 30 AH-64D Apache helicopters, Patriot anti-missile systems, additional missiles, torpedoes, aircraft survivability equipment, two long-range early warning radars, three air traffic control radar sets, and electronic warfare systems.
On 02 June 2004 the Executive Yuan approved the Defense Ministry's special budget allocations for major military procurement programs worth a total of NT$610.8 billion (about US$18.23 billion). The money to finance the special budget will come from NT$94 billion through the release of shares of state-owned enterprises, NT$100 billion from the selling of state-owned land, and the raising of the national debt of NT$420 billion. The proposed budget would cover six sets of Patriot Advanced Capability III anti-missile systems, eight conventional submarines and 12 P-3C anti-submarine aircraft.
From: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... budget.htm
The core policy of Taiwan's National Military Strategy is to avoid war, and to assure the security and stability of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan must maintain an appropriate defense capability to guarantee the survival of the island as well as the security and prosperity of the people. Taiwan's major equipment acquisition policies are as follows: 1. Under the strategic directive of effective deterrence, robust defense, acquisitions must meet the basic requirements of major weapons and equipment for Taiwan's defense operations. 2. Acquisitions must be consistent with complete life-cycle management and integrated logistic planning. 3. Acquisitions must comply with technology transfers, or training packages and other software so that weapons and equipment can be used to their full effect.
In order for Taiwan to reach their goal of effective defense, important elements of their buildup and development include early warning, information & electronic warfare superiority, counter blockade capability, long-range precision, and force integration. In addition, a C4ISR system has also become a strategic objective, as it would enhance the combat power of the combined joint operations of the Taiwan armed forces. Taiwan is expected to build its national defense capability to emphasize quality and power over quantity by fielding a C4ISR system and by acquiring defensive weapons. The key to success in defending Taiwan is information superiority over the PRC. Information superiority is essential, because the characteristics of the PLA threat include synchronized, multi-faceted, surprise, and quick attacks. Information warfare is expected to be a prelude to an attack against Taiwan, and in order to counter the threats of the PLA, the Taiwan Armed Forces need to immediately take synchronized, and rapid defensive combat actions. From a C4ISR system point of view, information superiority is crucial to achieving victory in combat. In order to enhance Taiwan's defensive capability, Taiwan's Armed Forces need a more sophisticated CS4ISR system that would provide the quick response, long range, high precision, and robustness demanded by future combat situations.
As the Legislative Yuan (LY) assumes more control of the MND budget, procurement plans require more staffing and approvals are slow. This adds to the frustrations felt by the Taiwan military, U.S. defense contractors and the U.S. Military Departments. Even with the difficulties encountered, the U.S. will continue to support the Taiwan military with defensive military equipment, technology, training and assistance in the years to come.
The defense budget for the ROC military was reduced annually during the 1990s and became more and more open to public scrutiny. The downward trend in ROC military expenditures was especially evident in fiscal 1994, when the budget shrank 4.65 percent. The defense budget is becoming increasingly public. In fiscal 1996, only 36 percent of the budget was considered confidential, in comparison to 51 percent in fiscal 1993 and 46 percent in 1994, respectively. The defense budget for fiscal 1996 will occupy just under 23 percent of the total government budget, down from 24.5 percent of the previous year.
Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) had a budget of US $9.57 billion for Fiscal Year 1996, which began July 1, 1995, a 2 percent increase over the previous year's budget. The national defense budget accounted for 23 percent of the total budget of the central authorities, a slight reduction from its 24.5 percent share of the total FY 95 budget. US $3.4 billion or 35.5 percent, of that budget was reportedly spent on military investment. Defense spending' as a percentage of Taiwan's GDP has been steadily decreasing over the past several years. The national defense budget for FY 1996 represented 3.6 percent of Taiwan's overall GDP.
Taiwan's National Defense budget amounted to New Taiwan Dollars (NTD) 274.78 billion or approximately USD 9.46 billion, for fiscal year 1998. The National Defense Budget accounted for 22.43 percent of the total budget of the Central Authorities, a 0.08 percent reduction from its 22.51 percent share of the total FY 97 budget. Defense spending's share of Taiwan's GDP has been steadily decreasing over the past several years. The National Defense Budget for FY 1998 represented 3.26 percent of Taiwan's overall GDP.
The national defense budget for FY 1999 amounted to NTD 284.5 billion (approx. USD 8.89 billion), or 22.7 percent of the total budget of the Central Authorities. The National Defense Budget for FY 1999 is projected to account for 3.06 percent of Taiwan's overall GDP. The budget for weapons purchases reportedly is NTD 60 billion (about USD 1.88 billion).
It has been projected that Taiwan will spend in excess of NT$700 billion (US$20.68 billion) for 11 items as a part of its arms-procurement spending from 2003 through 2012. While the U.S. supplies the bulk of Taiwan arms purchases, and will continue to do so in the years to come, Taiwan's indigenous capabilities have gradually expanded, with a majority of the building taking place with the United States' assistance. To fulfill current customers' needs, total services and commercial logistic support to maintain or upgrade Taiwan's existing defense force are required. In the near future, the most urgent defense requirements are the integration tasks between current platforms and weapons within and among Taiwan's armed forces. However, the Taiwan defense industry's long-range plans include integrated battlefield management and C4ISR upgrades.
On the horizon, and as a matter of public record, are the intended purchases of four Kidd-class destroyers, 12 P-3C Orion submarine-hunting aircraft, nine CH-47SD Chinook transport helicopters, eight conventional submarines, a batch of new Tienkung-series air defense missiles, a dozen MH-53H mine sweeping helicopters, Paladin artillery system, AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles, 30 AH-64D Apache helicopters, Patriot anti-missile systems, additional missiles, torpedoes, aircraft survivability equipment, two long-range early warning radars, three air traffic control radar sets, and electronic warfare systems.
On 02 June 2004 the Executive Yuan approved the Defense Ministry's special budget allocations for major military procurement programs worth a total of NT$610.8 billion (about US$18.23 billion). The money to finance the special budget will come from NT$94 billion through the release of shares of state-owned enterprises, NT$100 billion from the selling of state-owned land, and the raising of the national debt of NT$420 billion. The proposed budget would cover six sets of Patriot Advanced Capability III anti-missile systems, eight conventional submarines and 12 P-3C anti-submarine aircraft.
I am not abandoning Yoyo, I am just dancing slowly away from it.
附上兇手...
不對...是參加名單....
Wayne, Claire, Happy, Charlie, Arthur,
Daisy, Rosa, Sherry, Sharon, Erica,
Grace.Jr, Grace, David.Liao, Alisha,
Lydia, Flora, Flora. Jr, Ariel, Austin
Ben, Sunny, David. Jr, Magret, Linda,
Jessica, Kate, Dawn, Stanley, Julian,
Jason, Salina, Joyce, Bill, Edison......共34人...
愛迪生小弟我看你的仇人還真不少呀....
祝你當兵愉快....快點逃離這些比學長還可怕的人吧
不對...是參加名單....
Wayne, Claire, Happy, Charlie, Arthur,
Daisy, Rosa, Sherry, Sharon, Erica,
Grace.Jr, Grace, David.Liao, Alisha,
Lydia, Flora, Flora. Jr, Ariel, Austin
Ben, Sunny, David. Jr, Magret, Linda,
Jessica, Kate, Dawn, Stanley, Julian,
Jason, Salina, Joyce, Bill, Edison......共34人...
愛迪生小弟我看你的仇人還真不少呀....
祝你當兵愉快....快點逃離這些比學長還可怕的人吧
There are only the pursued, the pursuing, the busy and the tired.